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JURISDICTION, STANDING, AND DECISIONAL STAN-
DARDS IN PARENT-NONPARENT CUSTODY DISPUTES-In
re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wn. App. 637, 626 P.2d 16 (1981).
Joshua Allen was born profoundly deaf in 1971. When his parents, Joe
and Dana Allen, were divorced, Dana was awarded custody of Joshua.
Dana was unable to adjust to Joshua's disability and therefore placed him
with her mother. Dana subsequently signed a custody modification
transferring Joshua's custody to Joe. Despite the modification, Joshua re-
mained with Dana's mother until Joe married Jeannie. Joshua then went
to live with Joe, Jeannie, and Jeannie's three children from a prior mar-
riage. I
When Joshua joined his new family, he was three years old, pro-
foundly deaf, and unable to speak or to communicate in sign language.
His intellectual development was substantially behind that of normal
hearing children of his age. 2 Four years later, at the time of Joe and Jean-
nie's marriage dissolution, Joshua could communicate in sign language
and his intellectual development was equivalent to that of hearing chil-
dren of the same age.
The trial court found that Joshua's remarkable achievements were due
primarily to Jdannie's dedication, determination, and love. 3 Jeannie and
her three children learned sign language and Jeannie taught the skills to
Joshua. She arranged a special training program for Joshua in the public
school, a program that is unique in the state. She took special classes
herself so she could help tutor and train Joshua at home. In Joshua's pres-
ence, she and her three children communicated exclusively in sign lan-
guage so that Joshua could participate fully in family conversations. The
dramatic results of Jeannie's devotion have attracted statewide attention. 4
Joe, on the other hand, developed only minimal sign language ability.
His attitude toward Joshua's future development was "apathetic and
fatalistic." 5
1. in re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wn. App. 637, 639-40, 626 P.2d 16, 18 (1981).
2. Id. at 641,626 P.2d at 19. The severe disability of born-deaf persons is due to their speech and
language deficits. The high premium placed on verbal facility in our culture means that intellectual
deficits are often associated with deafness. For example, the average deaf adult in the United States
scores below the fourth-grade level on standardized reading tests. On non-language tests of intelli-
gence, however, deaf persons score at or near the mean. Deaf persons' communication disabilities
can be significantly diminished by sign language and lip reading ability, but training in these skills is
usually very inadequate. Nevertheless, with proper training, deaf persons can and do succeed in
intellectual pursuits. Schein, Hearing Impairments and Deafness, in HANDBOOK OF SEVERE DISABIL-
rrv 395,398-99 (1981).
3. Allen. 28 Wn. App. at 642, 626 P.2d at 19-20.
4. ld.at641,626P.2dat 19.
5. Id. at 641-42, 626 P.2d at 19.
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When Joe and Jeannie's marriage disintegrated, Jeannie petitioned for
dissolution and for custody of all four children. 6 The trial court granted
Jeannie's petition. The award of Joshua's custody was based "in part on a
finding of unsuitability on the part of the father," but also on the special
family relationship between Jeannie, Joshua, and the other children and
the educational program Jeannie had set up for Joshua.7 The trial court
gave both Joe and Dana liberal visitation rights.
In upholding this custody award, Division Three of the Washington
Court of Appeals answered a number of troubling questions attending
parent-nonparent custody disputes in the context of dissolution actions.
The court held: (I) a court has jurisdiction over all children dependent on
either or both of the parties; 8 (2) a stepparent who stands in loco parentis
to a child has standing to seek custody of the child; 9 and (3) when a cus-
tody dispute is between a parent and a nonparent, a more stringent stan-
dard than the "best interests of the child" is required. To gain custody, a
nonparent must show that "actual detriment" to the child would result if
custody were awarded to the parent. 10
This Note contends that, based on the custody statute and relevant case
law, the court of appeals should have answered these questions differ-
ently. The Note first proposes that, in a dissolution action, the trial court
should have automatic jurisdiction only over the children born of that
marriage. The court should have jurisdiction over other children only if
they are not in the custody of either of their parents or if neither parent is a
suitable custodian. Second, it proposes that a stepparent should not auto-
matically have standing to seek custody of a child based on an in loco
parentis relationship. A stepparent should have to separately petition the
court for custody, alleging that the child is not in the custody of either
parent, or that neither parent is a suitable custodian. I Finally, it proposes
that the "best interests of the child" standard should apply to all custody
determinations, including those between a parent and a nonparent.
This Note concludes that, under Allen, the custody of all stepchildren
will be an issue in a dissolution action involving one of their parents. This
holding may well increase the number of contested dissolutions and ren-
der uncertain the custody of increasing numbers of children.
6. Joe had adopted Jeannie's three children, but Dana, Joshua's mother, had refused to allow
Jeannie to adopt Joshua. Id. at 640,626 P.2d at 18.
7. Id. at 642, 626 P.2d at 20 (quoting the trial court).
8. id. at 643-44.626 P.2d at 20-21.
9. Id. at 644,626 P.2d at 21.
10. Id. at 649,626 P.2d at 23.




A. Jurisdiction and Standing
1. In General
Nonparents are usually involved in child custody disputes in three situ-
ations. First, the state may exercise its power as parens patriae to remove
a child from a harmful home environment. 12 In this situation, the court
exercises a child-protection function. 13 If the court determines that the
child has been abused or neglected, it has jurisdiction to determine
whether further state intervention is appropriate. Private third parties of-
ten become involved in the child's custody at this stage by becoming fos-
ter parents. 14
Second, foster parents and other nonparents are frequently involved as
defendants in suits by parents seeking to regain custody of their chil-
dren. 15 In this situation, the court exercises a private-dispute-settlement
function 16 and its jurisdiction is granted by various statutes. 17
Third, several states have adopted section 401(d) of the Uniform Mar-
12. Prior to the seventeenth century in England, the feudal concept of children as chattels pre-
vailed and parents had absolute power over their children. Consequently, custody of a child was
never an issue because no one had standing to intervene between a parent and child. During the
seventeenth century, the concept of parens patriae developed and the Crown undertook the duty,
delegated to the chancery courts, to protect subjects unable to care for themselves. Therefore, the
state gained standing to intervene in the parent-child relationship on behalf of children to protect them
or their property. McGough & Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in
Parent-ThirdParty Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 209-10, 217-21 (1978).
13. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONtEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 229.
14. Id. at 240-43.
15. Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,
73 YALE L.J. 151,151 n.4 (1973). See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); In re Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d 89, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977); In re Palmer, 81
Wn. 2d 604, 503 P.2d 464 (1972).
16. Mnookin, supra note 13, at 229. The difference between the courts' child-protection and
private-dispute-settlement functions is important because different problems and remedies, and hence
different standards for decision, apply in the two situations. When the state intervenes because a child
has been neglected or abused, the court may terminate all parental rights. Id. at 244-46. This is a
drastic remedy with constitutional implications, since "the right of the individual ... to marry, to
establish a home and bring up children" is a fundamental liberty protected by the federal Constitu-
tion. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). In a private custody proceeding, on the other
hand, less than the whole bundle of rights is involved. Even if custody is awarded to a nonparent, the
parent usually is awarded visitation rights, as in Allen, and the child is still legally the parent's for
such purposes as intestate succession.
17. See, e.g., Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975) (habeas corpus statute); Stevens
v. Stevens, 86 Mich. App. 258, 273 N.W.2d 496 (1978) (child custody statute); Frederick v. Freder-
ick, 617 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 198 1) (dissolution statute); In re Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d 89, 369
N.E.2d 1047 (1977) (juvenile court statute).
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riage and Divorce Act.18 This provision grants a nonparent standing to
institute a custody proceeding against a parent defendant. Section 401(d)
also grants courts jurisdiction to decide the issue, but only if the child is
not in the custody of one of its parents. 19 Therefore, although a stepparent
may petition for custody in some situations, he or she is unlikely to be
able to petition for custody in a dissolution action. 20
2. In Washington
Child custody proceedings in Washington must be commenced under
RCW § 26.09.180.21 The statute has both standing and jurisdictional as-
pects and applies to both parents and nonparents.
A parent has standing to invoke the court's jurisdiction over child cus-
18. UNIF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d). 9A U.L.A. 194 (1979). States that have
adopted § 401(d) of the Act include: Arizona, ARIZ REv STAT ANN § 25-331 (Supp. 1982): Colo-
rado, COLO REV STAT § 14-10-123 (1973); Illinois, Marriage & Dissolution Act § 601. ILL ANN
STAT ch. 40, § 601 (Smith-Hurd 1980): Indiana, IND- STAT ANN § 31--I 11.5-20 (Bums 1980):
Kentucky, KY REV STAT § 403.260 (1981): Minnesota, MINN- STAT § 518.156 (Supp 1982): and
Washington, WASH REV CODE § 26.09.180 (1981).
Washington is unique among the states that have adopted this provision in that the Washington
provision adds a second situation in which a nonparent may petition for custody-namely, when the
petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian. WASH REV CODE § 26.09.18011(b)
(1981).
19. Section 401(d) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act states:
A child custody proceeding is commenced in the ... court:
( I) by a parent, by filing a petition
(i) for dissolution or legal separation: or
(ii) for custody of the child in the [county, judicial district] in which he is permanently resi-
dent or found: or
(2) by a person other than a parent. by filing a petition for custody of the child in the [county.
judicial district] in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical
custody of one of his parents.
9A U.L.A. 194 (1979).
20. For example, if a child has been living with one parent and a stepparent and the parent dies.
the stepparent could institute a custody proceeding against the child's surviving. noncustodial parent.
21 WASH REV CODE§ 26.09.180(1981):
(I) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the superior court:
(a) By a parent:
(i) By filing a petition for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or declaration of invalidity:
or
(ii) By filing a petition seeking custody of the child in the county where the child is perma-
nently resident or where he is found: or
(b) By a person other than a parent. by filing a petition seeking custody of the child in the
county where the child is permanently resident or where he is found, but only if the child is not
in the physical custody of one of its parents or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a
suitable custodian.
(2) Notice of a child custody proceeding shall be given to the child's parent. guardian and
custodian, who may appear and be heard and may file a responsive pleading. The court may.
upon a showing of good cause, permit the intervention of other interested parties.
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tody by following either of two procedures. A parent may file a petition
for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or declaration of the mar-
riage's invalidity. 22 Alternatively, a parent may file a petition seeking
child custody. 23 The court has jurisdiction over a dissolution action and
attendant custody determination brought by a parent who is a Washington
resident or who is a member of the armed forces stationed in Washing-
ton. 24 The court also has jurisdiction over a custody proceeding instituted
by a parent if the child is permanently residing in or is found in the county
in which the petition is filed. 25
A nonparent only has standing to file a petition seeking child custody in
two situations: (1) if the child is not in the custody of a parent; or (2) if the
petitioner alleges that neither of the child's parents is a suitable custo-
dian. 26 The court's jurisdiction depends on the petitioner's ability to
prove one of these threshold requirements. If the court finds either that the
child is in the custody of a parent or that at least one parent is a suitable
custodian, it must dismiss the action. 27
B. Standards
1. In General
When a custody dispute is between a child's parents in a dissolution
action, most state courts make their determinations based on the "best
interest of the child" standard. 28 When a custody dispute is between a
parent and a nonparent, however, there is no consensus among states on
the standard to apply. The standards applied by various jurisdictions form
a continuum between the two leading doctrines in this area: "parental
rights" and "best interests of the child." 29
Under the parental rights doctrine, courts automatically award custody
to the parent unless he or she is found to be unfit.30 This doctrine is based
22. Id. § 26.09.180(l)(a)(i).
23. Id. § 26.09.180(1)(a)(ii).
24. Id. § 26.09.030.
25. Id. § 26.09.180(i)(a)(ii).
26. Id. §26.09.180(1)(b).
27. In an action brought under the dissolution statutes, "the court has no jurisdiction to grant
relief unless authority to do so can be found in Washington statutes." Jones v. Mine, 77 Wn. 2d 381,
390, 462 P.2d 927, 932 (1969) (Hunter, C.J., dissenting).
28. Mnookin, supra note 13, at 236.
29. Note, supra note 15, at 152. See generally Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological Par-
ents: The Courts' Response to New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L.
545 (1978-79) (survey of standards applied in all states).
30. Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Betveen Foster Parents and
Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 149, 153 (1980).
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on an almost mystical belief in the superiority of biological parents. 3' Ju-
risdictions that apply the parental rights doctrine focus entirely on the fit-
ness of the parent. Even if a child has been in the custody of a third party
for years, courts in these jurisdictions will return the child to a "fit" par-
ent, notwithstanding the major disruption that this action can cause in the
child's life. 32
At the other end of the continuum is the "best interests of the child"
doctrine. This doctrine focuses on the child rather than on the parent. 33 It
incorporates the expanding knowledge of child psychology and develop-
ment, most notably the "psychological parent" concept advanced in the
influential book Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.34 The psychologi-
cal parent-child relationship is based on "day-to-day interaction, com-
panionship, and shared experiences," 35 rather than a biological tie. Thus.
any caring adult who is the parent figure in a child's daily life will become
the child's psychological parent.
Closely allied to the psychological parent concept is the recognized im-
portance of continuity in a child's relationships. 36 Virtually all psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists agree that continuity and stability are essential to
children and that disruption of the parent-child relationship puts a child at
31. See. e.g., Behn v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (biological
parent has "a natural God-given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship and companionship of
his offspring").
32. See. e.g., Carvalho v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 44, 274 S.E.2d 471(1981) (court is to focus solely on
parent's fitness): Herbst v. Herbst, 211 Kan. 163, 505 P.2d 294 (1973) (child returned to mother after
living with grandparents for five years): Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976) (child re-
turned to mother after living with grandparents for six years): Frederick v. Frederick, 617 S.W.2d
629 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (court refused to abandon parental rights doctrine on basis of sociological
and psychological data): In re Fish, 174 Mont. 201, 569 P.2d 924, 928 (1977) (child cannot be
"adversely possessed").
33. See, e.g.. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 92 111. App. 3d 124. 415 N.E.2d 1105 (1980) (rights of parents
must yield to best interests of child: not necessary that parent be found unfit or to have legally for-
feited right to custody if it is in child's best interest to be placed in custody of nonparent): It re
Kowalzek. 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45 (1978) (natural parent may be fit to care for child, but
all other circumstances may dictate that the best interests of the child would be served by nonparent
custody award); In re Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d 89, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977) (welfare of the child is the
interest given priority).
34. J. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREUD & A.J. SOLNIT. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF TItE CHILD (new ed.
1979). The authors define *parent' from the child's perspective:
[F]or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not the direct cause of his
emotional attachment. This attachment results from day-to-day attention to his needs for physi-
cal care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation. Only a parent who provides for these
needs will build a psychological relationship to the child on the basis of the biological one and
will become his "'psychological parent" in whose care the child can feel valued and *'wanted."
An absent biological parent will remain, or tend to become, a stranger.
Id. at 17.
35. id. at 19.
36. See generally id. at 31-52 (discussing importance of continuity in child-parent relation-
ships).
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significant risk. 37 Courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the best inter-
ests of the child standard recognize and emphasize both the psychological
parent38 and the continuity concepts. 39
Some jurisdictions fall in between these two poles. Those closer to the
parental rights end of the continuum state that there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a child's best interests will be served by being in the cus-
tody of a natural parent. These jurisdictions give the nonparent the burden
of rebutting this presumption.40 Although the courts differ over the
weight of this burden, they agree that parental rights are not absolute.
Therefore, they hold that a parent need not be proven "unfit" before a
nonparent is awarded custody, and that the paramount concern of the
court is the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, procedural devices,
such as a presumption in favor of the natural parent, increase the proba-
bility that the parent will be awarded custody.4' Jurisdictions that employ
these devices are therefore closer to the parental rights end of the contin-
uum.
Other intermediate jurisdictions are closer to the "best interests" end
of the continuum. Courts in these jurisdictions require a showing of "ex-
traordinary" or "exceptional" circumstances before they will award cus-
tody to a nonparent. These circumstances include the duration of the par-
ent-child separation and the adverse effect that a change in custody may
have on the child.42 These courts' recognition of the importance of conti-
37. Mnookin, supra note 13, at 258 n. 161,264-65.
38. See, e.g., Borsdorfv. Mills, 275 So. 2d 338 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973), where the court stated:
The bonds of love between parent and child are not dependent upon blood relation and instinct,
but may be forged as strongly in the crucible of day to day living. Out of the actual relationship
of parent and child love grows. It is not merely a product of the biological function of conception
and giving birth. To give paramount consideration to the principle of parental priority or owner-
ship in custody decisions would often be an anathema to the best interest of the child.
Id. at 341. The court held that the psychological parent relationship was "more than sufficient" to
support a custody award to the nonparent. Id.
In Commonwealth v. Kraus, 185 Pa. Super. 167, 138 A.2d 225 (1958), the court awarded custody
of a child to his stepmother rather than his natural mother on psychological parent grounds. The court
also considered the child's close relationship with his stepsisters. Id. at 229.
39. See, e.g., Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 63 I11. App. 3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1978) (after custo-
dial father's death, court allowed stepmother to retain custody rather than changing to natural mother
because a change in custody would be damaging to the children's emotional health); De la Hoya v.
Saldivar, 513 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (custody continued in aunt although father continu-
ally visited children, paid for their support, and demonstrated love for them and interest in their
welfare).
40. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 86 Mich. App. 258, 273 N.W.2d 490 (1978); Whitlatch v.
Whitlatch, 206 Neb. 527, 293 N.W.2d 856 (1980); Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512
(1980); De ]a Hoya v. Saldivar, 513 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
41. Note, supra note 15, at 154 n.18.
42. See, e.g., Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977) (factors in determining
-exceptional circumstances" include: length of separation of parent and child; child's age when care
assumed by nonparent; possible emotional effect on child of change in custody; lapse of time before
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nuity for a child and their overall focus on the child's welfare place their
jurisdictions close to the "best interests" classification.
2. In Washington
Washington courts have vacillated between the two ends of the parental
rights-best interests continuum, but there has been a definite movement
toward the best interests of the child standard in parent-nonparent custody
disputes. In early cases, the Washington courts adhered to the traditional
parental rights doctrine, ignoring evidence of a well-established psycho-
logical parent relationship or of an extended separation of parent and
child. 43 There is no discussion of the needs and welfare of the children
involved in these cases; the courts focused exclusively on the fitness of
the parents.
An early sign of a shift away from the parental rights doctrine came in
1926, when the Washington Supreme Court upheld an award of custody
to a child's aunt, with whom the child had lived for eight years. 44 The
court stated that, "notwithstanding the original and primary right of a
parent, the great and leading object to be obtained is the welfare of the
child." 45
The supreme court similarly upheld a custody award to a stepmother in
a 1953 case, Eickernan v. Eickerman.46 Although the trial court held that
parent sought to reclaim child; nature and strength of ties between child and nonparent; intensity and
genuineness of parent's desire to have child: and certainty of child's future with the parent): Bennett
v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976) ("extraordinary circum-
stances" include a prolonged separation of the child and natural parent. during which time the child
has established a parent-child relationship with a nonparent).
43. See, e.g.. In re Ward, 39 Wn. 2d 894. 239 P.2d 560 (1952) (natural parent entitled to cus-
tody unless proven to be unfit): Penney v. Penney, 151 Wash. 328. 275 P. 710 (1929) (father entitled
to custody notwithstanding the child's ten-year relationship with another family): In re Smith. 118
Wash. 1, 202 P. 243 (1921) (father entitled to custody as against child's grandparents): In re Mead.
113 Wash. 504, 194 P. 807 (1920) (father awarded custody of his four-year-old daughter even though
daughter had lived all but two months with another family): In re Neff. 20 Wash. 652. 45 P. 383
(1899) (father entitled to custody unless proven to be unfit): Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9
Wash. 419, 37 P. 660 (1894) (parents entitled to custody unless proven to be unfit).
Penney v. Penney, 151 Wash. 328, 275 P. 710 (1929), affords a typical example of these cases. In
Penney the supreme court awarded custody to the child's father instead of the nonparents with whom
his daughter had been living for ten years. The only significant factors, according to the court, were
that the father was not unfit and that he had not abandoned the child. Neither the strong bond of love
between the child and the nonparent family nor the child's wishes carried any weight. Of paramount
importance to the court was that the child, even though thirteen years old at the time of the custody
award, would "be a Penney, as she was bom. with the memories and traditions of a Penney. and not
a Mohr, whose traditions may be wholly foreign to those of the Penney family." Id. at 336. 275 P. at
713.
44. InreAllen. 139Wash. 130, 245 P. 919(1926).
45. Id. at 131,245 P. at 920.
46. 42 Wn. 2d 165, 253 P.2d 962 (1953). Custody had originally been awarded to the step-
Parent-Nonparent Custody Disputes
the father had neither waived nor abandoned his parental rights, it disre-
garded the parental rights precedents under which the father would have
regained custody of the children automatically. Instead, the trial judge
visited the father and the stepmother, evaluated their respective home en-
vironments, talked with the children, and heard extensive evidence. In
reaching its decision not to grant custody to the father, the trial court gave
considerable weight to the fact that the stepmother was the only mother
the children had ever known. It held that the children were entitled to the
security that only the stepmother could continue to give them. 47 By up-
holding the trial court's reasoning, methodology, and decision, the su-
preme court implicitly rejected the parental rights doctrine in favor of the
best interests of the child standard.
Finally, in 1972, the supreme court expressly rejected the parental
rights doctrine in In re Palmer.48 In Palmer, the court of appeals had held
that a child's natural parents could not be deprived of custody in favor of
a grandmother with whom the child had lived for three years unless the
parents were unfit and would jeopardize the child's welfare. 49 In revers-
ing, the supreme court stated, "We hold that the welfare of the child is
the only operative standard at this stage of the proceedings and all other
considerations are secondary. "50 The court then proceeded to enumerate
the factors to be considered in determining the best interests of the child,
referring to the same standards used in a dissolution action involving a
child's parents. 5' The court remanded the case for a determination of the
child's best interests.
The trend away from the parental rights doctrine was also manifested in
a new and original provision added to the 1973 Dissolution Act. 52 This
provision enables nonparents to institute a custody proceeding by show-
ing that the child is not in a parent's custody or that neither parent is a
suitable custodian. One scholar has interpreted the "unsuitability" re-
quirement to be both less stringent than the old "unfitness" requirement
and a means of balancing the parents' legitimate interests with the child's
mother in a dissolution action between her and the children's father. The dissolution decree incorpo-
rated the father's agreement that custody of his children should be awarded to their stepmother. When
the father later sought a modification of the dissolution decree to regain custody of the children, the
trial court denied the father's request and the supreme court upheld the decision.
47. Id. at 167,253 P.2d at 963.
48. 81 Wn. 2d 604, 503 P.2d 464 (1972).
49. ht re Palmer, 6 Wn. App. 486, 493, 494 P.2d 233, 237, rev'd, 81 Wn. 2d 604,503 P.2d 464
(1972).
50. 81 Wn. 2d at 605,503 P.2d at 465.
51. Id. at 606, 503 P.2d at 466 (quoting Chatwood v. Chatwood, 44 Wn. 2d 233, 239, 266 P.2d
782, 785-86(1954)).
52. WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.09.180(1981) (reprinted supra at note 21).
Washington Law Review
needs. 53 Furthermore, the provisions of the Dissolution Act indicate a
significant movement toward favoring the child's interests over the par-
ents' absolute rights. 54
II. THE ALLEN COURT'S REASONING
The first issue before the Allen court was whether the superior court
had jurisdiction under RCW § 26.09.180 to determine Joshua's custody.
Jeannie's petition had not alleged that Joshua was not in the custody of
one of his parents or that neither of Joshua's parents was a suitable custo-
dian. 55 The trial court, however, had found both parents unsuitable.
based on evidence admitted during the trial. 56 The Allen court held that
the jurisdictional issue was negated because Jeannie's pleadings had been
amended by the proof produced at the trial, pursuant to CR 15(b).57
The court then went on to state, "More importantly, we hold that in a
dissolution action the custody of all children is before the court." 58 The
court reasoned that the statute dealing with petitions for dissolution gives
the court jurisdiction over all children because it requires a statement of
the "names, ages, and addresses of any child dependent upon either or
both spouses." 59
The second issue before the Allen court was whether Jeannie had stand-
ing to seek custody of Joshua. The court held that a stepparent may com-
mence a proceeding for custody of a stepchild in a dissolution action in
the same manner as a parent if the stepparent stands in loco parentis to the
child. 60 The court of appeals reasoned that because the rights and liabili-
ties of the in loco parentis relationship are substantially the same as those
53 Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?. 49 WASH L. REv 375. 408
(1974).
54. The provisions of the Dissolution Act "'suggest a purposeful movement away from the phi-
losophy that parents *own' children and can be 'deprived' of their rights only by a showing of unfit-
ness. The trend is toward a premise that the child's welfare is more significant than the claim of
parental rights." Id. at 407.
55. Allen,28 Wn.App.637,642-43.626P.2d 16,20(1981).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 643, 626 P.2d at 20. Civil Rule 15(b) states in relevant part:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties.
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment: but failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(b).
58. Allen, 28 Wn. App. at 643, 626 P.2d at 20.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.020(d) (1981).
60. Allen. 28 Wn. App. at 644,626 P.2d at 21.
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in a parent-child relationship, 61 a stepparent who stands in loco parentis
to a child should have the same rights as a parent. 62 Because Jeannie ob-
viously met this requirement, the court held that she had the same right as
a parent to seek custody of Joshua.
In considering the third issue, the standard to be applied, the court
found that the trial court had erred in applying the best interests of the
child standard of RCW § 26.09.190.63 This is the standard applied in a
custody determination between parents, but the court required "a more
stringent balancing test . . . to justify awarding custody to [a] nonpar-
ent. '64 The court settled on an "actual detriment" standard: "[W]here
circumstances are such that the child's growth and development would be
detrimentally affected by placement with an otherwise fit parent," cus-
tody may be awarded to a nonparent rather than to the parent. 65 Because
the court found that Joshua's development would be detrimentally af-
fected if he were placed in Joe's custody, it affirmed the judgment.
III. ANALYSIS
The Allen court's holdings on all three issues are unsound and could
lead to unfortunate results. Its holding that the superior court has jurisdic-
tion over all dependent children is based on misconstruction of the disso-
lution statutes. Its holding that an in loco parentis relationship between a
nonparent and a child gives the nonparent the same standing as a parent to
seek custody is reasonably derived from the common law, but it is not
grounded in the Washington statute. Finally, the court's holding that the
best interests of the child standard does not apply in a parent-nonparent
custody dispute contradicts both case law and a careful reading of the
statutes.
A. Jurisdiction and Standing
The Allen court properly found that the superior court had jurisdiction
over Joshua's custody under RCW § 26.09.180 because it had found both
Joshua's parents to be unsuitable. The court should have ended its discus-
sion of jurisdiction at this point, having disposed of the issue in the case
under the appropriate statute. The court, however, went on to hold, alter-
natively, that the superior court has jurisdiction in a dissolution action
61. See State ex rel. Gilroy v. Superior Court, 37 Wn. 2d 926, 933,226 P.2d 882, 886 (1951).
62. Allen, 28 Wn. App. at 644, 626 P.2d at 21 (1981).
63. Id. at 645-46, 626 P.2d at 21.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 647,626 P.2d at 22.
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over all children who are dependent on either or both spouses. In doing
so, it first misapplied one statutory provision and then misread another.
The court relied on RCW § 26.09.020, the "petition provision," to
support its alternative jurisdictional holding. This provision requires in-
formation about all children dependent on either or both of the spouses,
but says nothing about child custody. Rather, it relates directly to the pro-
vision governing the court's final decree, which must include a just and
equitable disposition of the parties' property and liabilities. 66
The petition provision's requirement of information about all depen-
dent children is intended to supply the court with information regarding
the parties' future economic circumstances for use in making the property
distribution. 67 Because a parent is often obligated to contribute to the sup-
port of a child of a prior marriage who is in the custody of a prior spouse,
the court needs information about all dependent children to evaluate and
project the duration of the parents' financial commitment. It does not log-
ically follow, however, that the custody of all dependent children is
within the court's jurisdiction. The petition provision is not jurisdictional
and the court should not have used it to determine jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court misconstrued the provision that does apply to
custody determinations in dissolution actions. As the court noted, "RCW
26.09.050 requires that the court in entering its decree of dissolution
'consider, approve, or make provision for child custody and visitation,
the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support ..... .68 The
court, however, seemed oblivious to the significant words "any child of
the marriage," and persisted in reading the petition provisions into the
custody provision. 69
The jurisdiction of the court in a dissolution action is prescribed and
limited by the applicable statute. 70 In Palmer v. Palmer,71 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that similar language in the 1949 divorce act pre-
cluded the court from taking jurisdiction of any children who were not of
66. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.050 (1981).
67. Id. § 26.09.080.
68. Allen, 28 Wn. App. at 643-44, 626 P.2d at 20 (quoting WASH. REV CODE § 26.09.050
(1981)).
69. The court stated, "Thus, the legislature in amending the dissolution statute in 1973 provided
the court with jurisdiction over all children 'dependent upon either or both spouses ....... "28 Wn.
App. at 644, 626 P.2d at 20 (quoting WASH. REV CODE § 26.09.020(1)(d) (1981)).
Although the words "child of the marriage" in RCW § 26.09.050 are appended only to "support"
and not to "child custody," the provision does not expressly require the court to provide for custody
of all children dependent on either of the spouses. Of the two possible readings of this provision, the
more reasonable one is that the entire sentence refers only to the children of the marriage.
70. In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn. 2d 183, 197, 634 P.2d 498, 506 (1981).
71. 42\Wn. 2d715,258 P.2d 475 (1953).
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the marriage. 72 In In re Marriage of Little, 73 the supreme court recently
discussed the jurisdiction of the courts under the dissolution statute. It
cited Palmer, with apparent approval, for the proposition that custody of
a child who is not a child of the marriage is beyond the jurisdiction of the
court in a dissolution action. 74
Thus, contrary to the Allen court's position, a court has jurisdiction
only over the children of the marriage in a dissolution action. Only par-
ents can petition for custody by filing a dissolution action under RCW §
26.09.180, and the court provides for their children's custody in the dis-
solution decree under RCW § 26.09.050. A stepparent must, therefore,
invoke the court's jurisdiction over other children through the relevant
procedures under the new custody provision. 75
The court of appeals' resolution of the standing issue has similar infir-
mities. It again could have resolved the issue by simply referring to RCW
§ 26.09.180. Because the court deemed that Jeannie's pleadings were
amended by the proof to include an allegation that neither of Joshua's
parents was a suitable custodian, the court could have held that Jeannie
had standing under RCW § 26.09.180 to petition for Joshua's custody.
Instead of relying on the nonparent provisions of the statute, however, the
court looked to the common-law in loco parentis doctrine to support Jean-
nie's standing under the statute. The court held that the provision author-
izing a parent to institute a custody proceeding by filing a petition for
dissolution "is also applicable to cases involving stepparents where the
stepparent can meet the requirements of standing in loco parentis. "76
The court's reasoning here is sound and is in accord with the psycho-
logical parent doctrine. It is just and proper that a stepparent who has
accepted full parental responsibilities and has given the child love and
security, like a natural parent, should thereby be accorded parental rights
72. Id. at 716-17,258 P.2d at 476.
73. 96Wn.2d 183,634P.2d498 (1981).
74. Id. at 197, 634 P.2d at 506. The court followed the citation to Palmer with a "but see" cite
to Eickerman v. Eickerman, 42 Wn. 2d 165, 253 P.2d 962 (1953). which is discussed supra at note
46. In Eickerman, the court had approved and was enforcing a contract between the parties. It could
do so even if it would not have had jurisdiction to make a custody order. The parties themselves can
enter into a custody contract that a court could not impose on them.
75. A nonparent may institute a custody proceeding under the provision by filing a custody peti-
tion, but only if the child is not in a parent's custody or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a
suitable custodian. If the petitioner can prove one of these threshold requirements, the court has
jurisdiction over the custody determination. WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.09.180(I)(b) (1981).
76. Allen, 28 Wn. App. at 644, 626 P.2d at 21. Although the court treats this issue as one of
standing, the implications are jurisdictional; i.e., if a stepparent who stands in loco parentis to a child
had the same standing as a parent to commence a custody proceeding by filing for dissolution, the
stepparent would stand in the same position as a parent and the stepchildren constructively would be
"children of the marriage." Thus, the court would have jurisdiction over the stepchildren's custody
as part of the dissolution action.
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with regard to the child. As far as the child is concerned, the stepparent is
his or her parent and the law should recognize this fact. Unfortunately,
however, the court's interpretation is not based on the language of the
statute, because the custody provision does not distinguish between non-
parents who stand in loco parentis to a child and those who do not.
A child custody proceeding is governed by the custody provisions of
the Dissolution Act and the court's jurisdiction is strictly limited by those
provisions. 77 The statute distinguishes parents from nonparents but makes
no special provision for nonparents who stand in loco parentis to children.
Thus, although the court's holding is consistent with the common-law in
loco parentis doctrine, it is unsupported by the custody statute and, there-
fore, is not a proper foundation for standing.
The Allen court's jurisdiction and standing holdings may have unfortu-
nate results. First, trial courts may begin to consider the custody, and not
merely the support, of children whose custody is not properly an issue in
a dissolution action. In an extreme case, a court could even consider the
custody of children from a party's prior marriage who are in the custody
of the prior spouse. Followed to its logical conclusion, the Allen decision
could cast uncertainty and instability over the custody of a great many
children. Second, trial courts following Allen are likely to consider the
custody of stepchildren to be automatically at issue in a dissolution. This
will complicate many dissolution actions because of the necessity of join-
ing the children's other parent, who otherwise would not be a party. 78
Third, the automatic inclusion of the custody of stepchildren as an issue
in dissolution actions may increase the number of contested dissolu-
tions. 79
B. Standard For Determining Custody
The Allen court held that a stepparent who has established an in loco
parentis relationship with a stepchild is entitled to parental status for
standing and jurisdiction, but not for determining custody. The court held
77. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
78. Changing the custody of these children would involve a modification of the original custody
decree under WASH REv. CODE § 26.09.260 (1981).
79. In an unpublished comparison of available data on Washington dissolution actions. Professor
Luvem V. Rieke found that dissolutions in which stepchildren but not children of the marriage were
involved more closely resembled childless dissolutions than those involving children of the marriage.
The latter group of dissolutions took longer to complete than the former, an arguable indication that
dissolutions involving children are more complex and more likely to be contested. L. Rieke. Update
on the Dissolution Act: Eight Years After (1981) (copy on file with the Washibgton Last Review). If
the custody of stepchildren automatically becomes an issue in a dissolution, it is likely that dissolu-




that the best interests of the child standard, which is applied in parental
custody disputes, is inapplicable to all custody disputes between a parent
and a nonparent regardless of the nonparent's relationship to the child. 80
The court stated that the only alternative standard recognized in Wash-
ington for awarding custody to a nonparent is a finding of parental unfit-
ness under the neglect and termination statutes. 81 The court recognized
that the unfitness standard is inapplicable to custody disputes under the
dissolution statutes because a custody award does not have the drastic
consequence of terminating all parental rights. 82 Therefore, the court de-
vised an intermediate standard under which a nonparent must show that
"the child's growth and development would be detrimentally affected by
placement with an otherwise fit parent." 83
Most of the Washington cases cited in the court's opinion deal with
dependency and termination proceedings.84 This is because the court had
before it only a one-sided presentation of this issue. 85 A fair examination
of the relevant case law might have led the court to conclude that the best
interests of the child standard is the proper standard to apply in parent-
nonparent custody cases under RCW § 26.09.180.
There are no prior appellate opinions of custody determinations under
this provision. 86 Nevertheless, when Washington courts have considered
80. Allen, 28Wn. App. at 645-46, 626 P.2d at 21.
81. Id. at 648-49, 626 P.2d at 23.
82. Id. at 649, 626 P.2d at 23. This commendable distinction is not recognized by courts in some
other states. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146, 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied
102 S. Ct. 1274 (1982), in which the Kansas Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute allowing
a legal custody award to a nonparent who had physical custody of a child after a dissolution if the best
interests of the child would be served and if the nonparent had formed a parental relationship with the
child. The court required a finding of parental unfitness for any award of custody to a nonparent. 630
P.2d at 1128.
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the burden of proof required in termination
of parental rights proceedings. The Court recognized that termination involves the loss of rights in
addition to custody. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). The Court noted that
"[t]ermination denies the natural parents physical custody, as well as the rights ever to visit, commu-
nicate with, or regain custody of the child." Id. at 1392 (footnote omitted). It also noted that "[flew
forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible." Id. at 1397.
83. Allen, 28 Wn. App. at 647, 649, 626 P.2d at 22, 23.
84. E.g., In re Aschauer, 93 Wn. 2d 689, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980) (permanent deprivation of
parental rights); In re Becker, 87 Wn. 2d 470, 533 P.2d 1339 (1976) (dependency); In re Luscier, 84
Wn. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974) (permanent deprivation of parental rights); In re Tarango, 23 Wn.
App. 126, 595 P.2d 552, review denied, 92 Wn. 2d 1022 (1979) (permanent deprivation of parental
rights).
85. Joe's brief stressed the early cases that adhered to the parental rights doctrine, and cited a line
of parent-nonparent custody cases. Brief for Appellant at 26-36. Jeannie's brief, on the other hand,
cited only one parent custody case, and did not discuss which standard should be applied in parent-
nonparent custody cases. Brief for Respondent at 9.
86. The cases cited supra at notes 43, 44, & 46 were all decided prior to 1973 when the new
custody provision was adopted.
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parent-nonparent custody issues under other statutes, the parties* argu-
ments were similar to those that would be considered under the current
provision. The parents assert that their parental status entitles them to cus-
tody of their children, and the nonparents assert that they can better fulfill
the children's needs and provide a better home. 87
The similarity of procedures and proof required in dependency cases
and in parent-nonparent custody cases supports the use of the best inter-
ests of the child standard in custody cases. A custody proceeding insti-
tuted by a nonparent is similar to a dependency proceeding in that both
involve a two-step procedure: first, the court must find facts sufficient to
give it jurisdiction, and second, the court must make a custody disposi-
tion. The court's jurisdiction in a dependency action depends on a finding
that the child is "dependent" under the statutory definition. 88 In a non-
parent custody proceeding, the court's jurisdiction depends on a finding
that the child is not in the custody of one of its parents or that neither
parent is a suitable custodian. 89 Thus, under both statutes, the most strin-
gent test occurs at the threshold, jurisdictional level. It is at this first stage
that the adequacy of the parents is an issue. Thereafter, the court can turn
its attention to the child. And it is at this point that the courts have
reiterated that the welfare or best interests of the child is the court's para-
mount concern. 90
The best interests of the child standard is also supported by the relevant
provisions of the Dissolution Act. The custody provision 9 states separate
criteria for parents and for nonparents who institute custody proceedings.
The immediately succeeding provision sets forth the standard for custody
disposition: "The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
best interests of the child." 92 No distinction is drawn between parents and
nonparents in this second provision. There is only one standard-the best
interests of the child. If the legislature had intended two separate stan-
87. See. e.g.. In re Palmer. 81 Wn. 2d 604, 503 P.2d 464 (1972): Eickerman v. Eickerman. 42
Wn. 2d 165. 253 P.2d 962 (1953).
88. WASH REv CODE §§ 13.34.020-.130 (1981). A child is removed from its parents only after
a fact-finding hearing establishes the child's dependency and after all possible assistance given to the
family has failed to remedy the parental inadequacies that would continue to harm the child.
89. WASH REv CODE§ 26.09.180(I)(b) (1981).
90. See. e.g.. In re Welfare of Hansen, 24 Wn. App. 27. 38, 599 P 2d 1304. 1310 (1979)
(" 'this court ... must be guided and must function according to one paramount consideration in all
child custody cases: the welfare of the child' ") (quoting In re Todd v. Superior Court. 68 Wn. 2d
587. 591. 414 P.2d 605. 608 (1966)). See also In re Becker, 87 Wn. 2d 470. 553 P.2d 1339 (1976)
(welfare of child is goal of dependency hearing): In re Palmer. 81 Wn. 2d 604. 503 P.2d 464 (1972)
(best interests of child is controlling consideration).
91. WASH REV CODE§26.09.180(1981).
92. Id. § 26.09.190.
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dards as well as two separate criteria for jurisdiction, it is reasonable to
assume that it would have stated the distinction in both provisions. 93
The court's concern that a more stringent standard is necessary in cases
involving a nonparent is adequately met under the statutory best interests
of the child standard. The provision directs the court to "consider all rele-
vant factors.' 94 When a custody contest is between a parent and a non-
parent, the additional factor of parental status is automatically included in
the balancing process in favor of the parent. 95 Furthermore, the language
of the provision is taken from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
which is "designed to codify existing law" and to preserve familiar pre-
sumptions-such as the presumption that "a parent is usually preferred
to a nonparent. "96 Thus, adequate protection for a parent's rights and
interests is already included in the statutory standard.
The court's adoption of the "actual detriment" standard may also cre-
ate several problems. It may blur the distinction between a custody award
and state intervention in the family to avert harm to a child due to parental
abuse and neglect. 97 The "actual detriment" standard could also lead to
trial courts construing "detriment" to mean extreme harm. This would
represent a return to the old standard under which a parent's right to cus-
tody depended solely on his or her minimal fitness. Such a return would
be inconsistent with the obvious trend in Washington law toward "a
premise that the child's welfare is more significant than the claim of par-
ental rights." 98
IV. CONCLUSION
In Re Marriage of Allen provides a concrete illustration of the maxim
93. According to Sutherland, " 'where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given
provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is signifi-
cant to show that a different intention existed.' "J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02
(C.D. Sands 4th ed. 1973) (quoting Western States Newspaper, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d
793, 22 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1962)).
94. WASH. REv. CODE§ 26.09.190 (1981).
95. Thus, in the unusual situation in which all other factors balanced out between the parent and
nonparent, the parent would be awarded custody because of the one additional factor in the parent's
favor. This would mean that the nonparent was not a "suitable custodian" either, given a child's
unique needs. As between two potentially minimally fit, but unsuitable, custodians, a parent would
be preferred. In Allen, for example, if Jeannie had not exerted herself on Joshua's behalf and had not
created a uniquely appropriate environment for him, but instead had shared Joe's apathy and pessi-
mism, she would not have been able to show any superior suitability as Joshua's custodian. Joshua's
custody would, therefore, most likely have been awarded to Joe.
96. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, Comm'rs' Note, 9A U.L.A. 198 (1979).
97. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between court's child-pro-
tection and dispute-settlement functions).
98. Rieke, supra note 49, at 407.
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that "hard cases make bad law." The Allen court reached the correct de-
cision about Joshua's custody. It is doubtful that anyone who reads the
facts of the case could deny that Joshua should continue to live with his
stepmother, Jeannie. In reaching its decision, however, the Allen court
went through needless analytic contortions, applied the wrong statutory
provision, and misconstrued the appropriate provision. Consequently, the
court's standing and jurisdictional holdings are unsupported by the statute
and the case law. These holdings might well increase the number of
contested dissolutions and create uncertainty about the custody of a great
many children.
Furthermore, the court should have adopted the best interests of the
child standard for cases arising under RCW § 26.09.180(l)(b). Parental
rights are sufficiently protected by the provision's threshold requirements
and by inclusion of parental status as a factor in the balancing process.
These protections are adequate without the sort of judicial "tinkering"
indulged in by the Allen court. The "actual detriment" standard created
by the court at best confuses the issue. At worst, this new standard threat-
ens a return to the old parental rights doctrine. Future courts should base
their decisions in parent-nonparent custody disputes solely on the best in-
terests of the child.
Sandra R. Blair
Vol. 58:99, 1982
